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Introduction
Little is known about the risk and return characteristics of private equity investments.
1 In a recent review paper, Gompers and Lerner (2000b) cite this as one aspect of "what we don't know about venture capital".
2 In this article we provide empirical evidence which bears on this question by estimating the probability of exit, industryadjusted exit multiples and expected gains on private equity investments for a large sample of venture-backed investments.
An examination of the exit outcomes of venture-backed financings is a question of interest to both the academic and practitioner community. First, as Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2001) point out, the private equity market is as important as the public market in terms of size and is actually larger for most of their sample period. The sheer size alone is reason enough to study the risk-return trade-off in this market. Also, Gompers and Lerner (2000b) assert that this is a critical area of study because when private equity is mixed with public equity in a portfolio, a better understanding of risk and return would result in superior portfolio choice. They believe that the current inability to value and determine the correlation of private firms with public firms imposes a serious impediment to optimal portfolio choice. Prior research estimated private equity performance using a proxy for private firms, such as publicly traded venture funds [Martin and Petty (1983) , Gompers and Lerner (1997) ]. In contrast, this paper investigates venture-backed companies to shed light more directly on the risk premium required for the valuation of private equity investments.
Second, our study is useful in determining the private company discount. Specifically, many finance professionals struggle with the issue of how to value private companies. Unlike publicly traded companies, a private company has no observable stock price to serve as an objective measure of market value. Investors may typically demand a discount for these investments because they may be unable to sell the asset for a period of time. A number of prior studies have attempted to estimate the lack of liquidity. These studies fall into one of three categories. The first estimates the marketability discount by comparing the price of an asset during a period 1 One notable exception is a contemporaneous paper by Cochrane (2001) , which discusses the biases inherent in this kind of analysis.
2 Hellman and Puri (1999) find that it is primarily the type of firm that determines the speed to an IPO. They report that innovator firms are usually faster to market than imitator firms, and amongst these, those with VC backing tend to make it to market even faster. Gompers (1996) shows that young VCs tend to "grandstand", i.e. take actions to signal their ability to investors, and hence they tend to be more aggressive in bringing firms to market. In addition, Lerner (1994) has shown that venture capitalists are able to time the market and bring their firms public under favorable conditions.
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in which it is non-marketable to a period in which it is marketable. Specifically, they compare share prices of firms in the initial public offerings (IPO) to transaction prices in those same shares prior to the IPO. 3 The second approach compares share prices of two claims on the same underlying asset, where one claim is marketable and the other is not. This approach is typically implemented by comparing the price of restricted stock with freely tradeable securities. 4 The third approach compares acquisition prices of private companies with those of comparable public companies.
5
As Bajaj, Denis, Ferris and Sarin (2001) argue, these approaches have several limitations. We account for some of the possible pitfalls in estimating the private company discount by comparing the valuation of the private firm with the expected value at the liquidity event. Additionally, our approach permits us to estimate the discount for companies in various stages of their growth cycle, industry and at different points in time. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgenssen state that 66% of private companies fail in their first 10 years. All these factors would lead to higher rates of required return on private equity, reflected in the discount charged at the time the venture capitalist invests in these firms. It is important to understand that what we are capturing is more than a non-tradeability discount. The venture capitalists provide an important monitoring and mentoring role to the companies they finance. They often sit on boards of companies in which they invest, and make available their network to these companies. Thus, almost certainly a part of the return is due to these activities.
Our empirical approach is straightforward. We start with a sample of over 52,000 rounds of financing over the period 1980-2000 for which we were able to obtain data from VentureXpert. We follow each of these investments, and estimate the probability of their being acquired or having an IPO. We find that for our sample the probability of an exit via an IPO is roughly 20-25%, and is fairly constant for firms financed in an early stage, expansion stage or later stage. Similarly, we find the probability of exit via an acquisition is approximately 10-20%. The probability of an acquisition is much higher for the firms financed in later stages. In other recent work covering a smaller period, Gompers and Lerner (1999b) report that, for the period 1983-1994, about 31% of the firms in the VentureOne database completed an IPO and another 29% were acquired. The overall probability of exit increases as we move from early to late stage companies. As many as 44% of the companies in late-stage financings experienced a liquidity event, while only 34% of early stage firms had a successful exit. There is also high cross-sectional variation in the probability of an exit across different industries. The high-tech, biotech and medical sectors had a higher probability of successful exit relative to new ventures operating in other sectors. We also find that there is a variation in time to exit across different stages of financing. For over two-thirds of late-stage companies, successful exit happens within three years of financing, while only one-third of early-stage companies have a liquidity event within three years of financing.
We next estimate the exit multiples obtained for firms which had an IPO or an acquisition/buyout. 6 We find that exit multiples are often high, and depend upon the stage of financing. For example, the average for early stage firms which have an IPO is about 21, and which have an acquisition/buyout is 10.23. Parts of these high multiples are a result of favorable valuation changes in the industry. Once we adjust the multiples for industry performance, the multiples for early stage companies are 16 and 7 respectively. Also, later stage investments return an average of 4 times the initial investment. After adjusting for industry movements, the multiples fall to around 2.5. Also, the multiples for acquired firms are usually much lower than the multiples for IPOs over the same time period and in similar industries. Average multiples for firms being acquired range from 10.2 for early stage firms to 4.6 for later stage companies. Also, there is substantial cross-sectional variation in the exit multiples across industries. Firms in the communications, Internet, and semiconductor segments had the highest multiples, followed closely by the firms in the software and hardware segments.
We also estimate the expected private equity multiples and discounts. In this measure, which we discuss in further detail in the body of the paper, we capture the multiples and concomitant discounts that the private equity purchasers get on their investments relative to the expected value at the exit. We find that gains on early stage financing tend to be higher than those from the other stages, presumably as a result of the higher risk borne by the private equity investor at this stage of the process. The average expected multiple is 5.12 for early stage companies, 2.04 for expansion stage companies and 1.12 for late stage investments. We also find that there is substantial industry variation in gains from private equity investments. Communications and the Internet segments account for much higher gains than do the other categories.
We also examine the cross-sectional determinants of the probability of exit, time to exit, and valuation multiples. We find that firms being financed in later stages and later rounds have a higher probability of exit, a lower time to exit, and lower valuation multiples. Also, the higher the amount of financing, the lower the probability of exit, the lower the time to exit, and lower the multiple. The new economy companies have a lower time to exit, and higher multiples. In addition, companies which are financed 6 The exit multiple is the ratio of the value of the firm upon successful exit to the amount of financing, making suitable adjustments for dilution.
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during hot IPO markets perform well. They have a higher probability of exit, lower time to exit and higher valuation multiples.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our data sources and reports descriptive statistics for the sample transactions. Section 3 reports evidence on the probability of exit categorized by year, industry, and stage of company being financed. Section 4 reports evidence on the exit multiple and section 5 provides results on the expected private equity gains. Section 6 presents the cross-sectional, multivariate analysis of the time to exit, probability of exit, and valuation multiples. Section 7 concludes.
Sample and Data Descriptions
2.1. Sample Selection. Our sample is obtained from Thompson Financial Data's VentureXpert database. VentureXpert obtains information on private equity investments from over 1,000 different companies that make private equity investments. Over 700 of these partner companies are venture funds, while over 250 are buyout and other equity funds. We limit our analysis to the period between 1980 and 2000. We further restrict the study to investments made in US private firms. This selection process results in a sample of 52,322 financing rounds in 23,208 unique firms. We follow these firms till there is an exit or till the end of 2000. The information about the exit is available in the VentureXpert database, and we verify it against the new issue database (for IPOs), and the mergers and acquisitions database (for acquisitions), also provided by Thompson Financial Data Corporation. Table 1 reports the frequency of financing rounds over time and across industries. Deal flow increases from the 1980s to the next decade. There appear to be cycles in the amount of private equity financing. The period 1986-90 evidenced large deal flow, which declined in the early 90s. More recently, the years 1996-2000 comprise a much higher level of financing than evidenced before. For example, in year 2000 we have data on 7386 financing rounds, which is more than double the number of deals financed in any year up to 1997. This increase in the period 1996-2000 is largely a function of increased capital commitments to the socalled "new economy" firms, e.g. internet, communications, hardware and software businesses.
Certain industries have received a large proportion of available private equity financing. The top five industry groups account for over 60% of the total number of 7 It is important to note that we examine private equity in the case of venture-backed firms. This constitutes a subset of the entire private equity in the economy. Our goal is to cast light on the risk and return relationship of venture financed companies. For a study covering a broader set of private companies, see Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2001) .
investments. The highest number of investments were in the computer software industry (16.4%), followed by internet (14.0%), communications (12.0%), medical (11.2%), and computer hardware (7.5%).
In Tables 2 and 3 we report the characteristics of the financing and exit over time and across industries.
8 There has been a steady increase over time in the average number of rounds of financing obtained by firms before liquidity events. Given the larger scale of start up firms in the 90s, it is likely that they required more financing than anticipated at the outset, marking a difference from the 1980s. This is also noticeable from the trend in the amount of money raised before IPO or being acquired.
Not surprisingly, the amount of financing prior to an IPO is higher than that raised before an acquisition. For example, for the Internet Company sector, an average firm raised 43 million dollars prior to an IPO versus 17 million prior to being acquired. Interestingly enough, the number of financing rounds before an acquisition is quite similar to that before an IPO, and in some years, tends to be higher.
Also we see, as others have documented, there are hot IPO periods.
9 Our data also shows that hot financing markets occur concurrently with hot IPO and acquisition markets. The correlation between the number of financing rounds and the number of IPOs is 94%, an extraordinarily high number. While the number of IPOs appears to increase slightly in the 1990s, there is a substantial increase in the number of firms being acquired, reflecting the recent increase in merger and acquisition activity.
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The liquidity events for our sample firms are also high in a select few industries. Not surprisingly, the same five industry groups, comprising over 60% of financing rounds, account for the bulk of the IPOs and acquisitions.
3. Exit Probabilities 3.1. Methodology. Each financing round in our sample is categorized based on the stage of the firm that was being financed. We follow the convention used in the database, thereby dividing the sample into 5 categories: early-stage companies, expansionstage, later-stage, buyout/acquisition stage and others (which includes stages classified as special situations).
Denote the i th financing in stage j in year t by f ijt , i = 1...N jt , j ∈ J, t = 1...T , where N jt is the number of financings in stage j in year t and T is the number of years in the database. Stage j is a choice from set J = {early, expansion, late, buyout, other}.
8 For some firms the exit strategy may be liquidation, and others may choose to remain private.
In our analysis, these firms are assumed to have failed to exit via a liquidity event.
9 See for example, Ritter (1991) . 10 It is also possible that the data on Acquisition is more readily available and completely collected by the Securities Data Corporation in the recent years.
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The total number of financing rounds in the database is then equal to:
For each financing f ijt , we record whether the financing resulted in an exit within 3 years of financing, and whether it ultimately resulted in an exit. Exit is marked by the indicator function 1 ijt , which indicates if the financing resulted in an exit, and by the indicator function 1 ijt if the exit also occurred within 3 years of financing (note that 1 ijt ≤ 1 ijt ). The probability of exit p(j, t) across all firms in financing stage j in year t is computed as follows:
Likewise, the probability of exit in 3 years across all firms in financing stage j in year t is computed as follows:
A similar analysis is undertaken for a classification of probabilities by industry and financing stage. Denote the i th financing in stage j in industry k by f ijk , i = 1...N jk , j ∈ J, k = 1...K, where N jk is the number of financings in stage j in industry k and K is the number of industry classifications in the sample. For each financing f ijk , we record whether the financing resulted in an exit within 3 years of financing, and whether it ultimately resulted in an exit. Exit is marked by the indicator function 1 ijk , which indicates if the financing resulted in an exit, and by the indicator function 1 ijk if the exit also occurred within 3 years of financing (note that 1 ijk ≤ 1 ijk ).
The probability of exit across all firms in financing stage j in industry k is computed as follows:
3.2. Exit probabilities. Panel A of table 4 presents the probability of an investment round in our sample having an IPO. Panel B presents similar data for an acquisition/buyout. Combined exit probabilities are depicted in Panel C. In addition to the overall probability of exit, we also estimate the probability of a liquidity event within three years of financing.
We find that the probability of exit via an IPO increases as we progress from early stage to the expansion stage, and into the later stage. The probability of a firm financed in the buyout stage to have an IPO is as expected quite low, as firms in that stage are more likely to be sold. The probability of exit falls off dramatically in the last three years in the sample (1998) (1999) (2000) . This is partly because for many of these recently financed firms, enough time has not passed for them to have had a successful exit. It is for this reason that we report averages of exit probabilities only for the sub-period 1980-1997.
We find that for our sample the probability of an exit via an IPO is roughly 20-25%, and is fairly constant for firms financed in an early stage, expansion stage or later stage. Similarly, we find the probability of exit via an acquisition is approximately 10-20%. The probability of an acquisition is much higher for the firms financed in later stages. Therefore, the total probability of exit lies in the range of 30-45%. In other recent work covering a smaller period, Gompers and Lerner (1999b) report that, for the period 1983-1994, about 31% of the firms in the VentureOne database completed an IPO and another 29% were acquired. They also found that around 19% of the firms were liquidated, and 21% were still privately held.
11 They conducted a logit regression to establish the determinants of the exit, and found that the development stage of the firm (i.e. development, beta, shipping, profitable or restart stage) is a significant determining factor. The variation across stages is quite marked in our data as well. Table 4 , Panel B reports the probability of exit via an acquisition. The probabilities increase as we move from early to late stage financings. However, it is interesting that the probability of an acquisition is actually slightly higher for early stage companies than it is for firms classified as buyout targets. This may be because many early stage firms that were unable to make it to the IPO stage settled instead for a buyout. Panel C reports the total probabilities of a liquidity event, either from an IPO or an acquisition. As many as 44% of the companies in late-stage financings experienced a liquidity event, reflecting the efficacy of the market for private equity. Table 5 presents exit probability data across different industry segments. Clearly, some industries have had a higher proportion of successful exits. Specifically, the "new economy" sectors evidenced much higher success rates. Also, across almost all industry groups we find that the probability of an IPO increases with the financing stage.
In results not reported, we also estimated exit probabilities stratified by the number of the financing round.
12 It is natural to expect that the probability of exit will 10 PRIVATE EQUITY DISCOUNT increase as the number of the round also increases. Renewed financing is usually conditional on prior success, and should presage an increase in the probability of a successful exit. Specifically, the probability of exit increases rapidly for the first two financing rounds, and increases very slowly thereafter. This suggests that failure is a greater danger in early rounds, as would be expected. It also implies that later rounds may be less useful in increasing the probability of success. Again, we see that the probability of exit increases with the stage of financing.
In addition, we estimated exit probabilities stratified by the amount of financing in the round. We first sorted our sample firms into deciles based on the amount of financing. We find that the probability of exit increases with the amount of financing, though this seems much more marked for IPO exits, than for exits via acquisition.
Finally, we examined exit probabilities stratified by the amount of the post-money valuation. For exits via an IPO, there is a marked increase in the likelihood of an exit as the valuation increases. It is interesting that exactly the opposite effect occurs for exits via acquisitions, i.e. the probability of exit declines as the post-money valuation increases. The conclusion that we draw from these opposite effects is that firms with high post-money valuations are more likely to exit via an IPO than by acquisition.
Exit Multiples
4.1. Methodology. The private equity valuation discount is reflected in the extra rate of return required on the private firm over the return earned by investing in a public firm. Investing in private equity is akin to buying a highly risky discount security, where the maturity date is unknown. Substantial payoff risk is also borne. Given these features, venture capitalists tend to think of payoffs more in terms of multiples of their initial investment, rather than in terms of steady, annual rates of return. Hence, part of the value creation comes from the the VCs ability to negotiate an attractively discounted price. Our goal in this paper is to cast light on the extent of this discount.
For each firm which has an IPO or is acquired, exit multiples are computed as follows, denoted X ijt or X ijk (generically X ij ) depending on whether the data is segmented by year of financing or by industry category respectively. The following variables are defined:
X ind = Industry Index (at IPO or ACQ) Industry Index at Financing
Here X ij is the return multiple expressed over the benchmark return. Both the valuation at exit and financing are post-money. This ratio is commonly used by venture capitalists as it provides a direct way of assessing the payback from the private equity investment. Notice that the excess return (denoted R ij ) is equal to (X raw − X ind ). Thus, on an initial investment of 100, an IPO at a value of 500 would imply that X raw = 5, and if the industry index went from 100 to 150, then the excess return is R ij = 350%. The excess multiple would be 5/1.5.
It is important to ensure that the raw multiple has been adjusted for dilution effects during the financing path, as the stake of the original capital providers gets diluted in subsequent financing rounds. This is best explained with an example. Let the original investment be 100. The second round of financing is also for an amount of 100, with a post-money valuation of 500. This implies that the original investors have parted with 20% of the firm (= 100/500). Hence the first round retention ratio is 80%. Assume then that the firm has an IPO value of 1000, and raises extra capital in the IPO of 300. The dilution at the IPO is 30% (= 300/1000), or a retention ratio of 70%. The cumulative retention ratio is therefore 56% (= 0.8 × 0.7). The multiple on the initial investment before dilution effects is 10 (= 1000/100). The multiple on the initial investment after dilution is correctly accounted for is equal to 5.6, i.e. the multiple of 10 multiplied by the cumulative retention ratio. Using similar logic, the second round investment multiple would be 1.4, i.e. the multiple of 2 (= 1000/500) diluted by the cumulative retention ratio of 70%.
Our multiple measure is not adjusted for the time between financing and exit. The annualized values are computed as follows:
Therefore, if X raw = 5, and the number of days from financing to IPO is 900, then
(365/900) = 5 0.40556 = 1.92075. The return is R annual = 0.92075, or 92% per annum.
This approach offers a method for normalization and comparison of gains, since each firm takes a different amount of time to exit. However, the measure does have some limitations. When the number of days is very small, the measure tends to inflate annualized multiples excessively. This often occurs when a financing has been undertaken just prior to an IPO. In the preceding example, if days = 10, then X annual = 3.25 × 1025. This creates outliers, which distort further empirical analysis. A pragmatic solution to this problem is to round up all fractions of a year to a whole 12 PRIVATE EQUITY DISCOUNT year. The new expression for annualized multiples is then stated by:
where the function CEIL(x) stands for the integer immediately greater than x. Hence, the same analysis in the steps above is now implementable using annualized multiples.
Exit Multiples.
Valuations at funding stage are usually affected by the state of the stock markets and supply of venture capital. Lerner (1997) finds that financing pressure significantly affects valuations. More money chasing deals will result in higher pre-money valuations. In a recent paper, Gompers and Lerner (2000b) construct a hedonic price index for venture valuations. This index is shown to be very sensitive to venture fund inflows. They estimate that a doubling of venture flows results in a 7-21% increase in valuation levels.
13 Table 6 presents valuation multiples by year of financing. We are able to assess whether there is time series variation in valuation multiples by year of financing, leading to an alternative view of "hot" financing markets, i.e. whether the year of financing determines exit multiples. In hot financing markets, money chases deals (Gompers and Lerner, 2000a) , and may result in higher post-money valuations, leading to lower realized multiples.
Panel A of Table 6 presents raw exit multiples for investments which led to an IPO for the period 1984-2000.
14 As is expected, the realized multiples are highest for early stage companies (21.01), a little lower for expansion stage firms (7.90), and are lowest for later stage companies (4.01). This pattern is noticeable for both multiples and annualized returns. Multiples for buyout stage firms are slightly higher than those for expansion stage firms. It is worth noting that multiples are often high, and the average for early stage firms is about 21, whereas the annualized average multiple for the same firm is a little greater than 2. This drops to about 4.01 (annualized 1.82) for later stage firms. There is wide variation in multiples across all the years we examined, and there is little evidence of a time trend over the past decade.
Panel B summarizes results for acquired firms, and the pattern of decreasing multiples as we progress from early stage to late stage firms is evident here as well. This 13 Valuations are known to be impacted by the degree of VC involvement. Barry, Muscarella, Peavy and Vetsuypens (1990) find that firms with a significant VC stake had much higher probabilities of successful exit, as well as lower IPO underpricing. These are important issues in determining valuation and exit probabilities. Megginson and Weiss (1991) also report that VC reputation has an impact on valuations.
14 Valuation data was unavailable for earlier periods.
pattern confirms the expected relationship between risk and return: firms in early stages bear much greater risk ex-ante. However, a distinctive finding is that the multiples for acquired firms are usually lower than those for IPOs. Average multiples range from about 10 for early stage firms to about 4.6 for later stage companies. Buyout stage firms have higher multiples. Once again, there is very high time series variation in multiples.
Panel C of Table 6 corresponds to Panel A, but presents the results after adjusting for returns that may be attributed to the industry. This results in a reduction in multiples, with IPOs ranging from 15.79 for early stage financings to 2.91 for later stage rounds. The multiples for acquisitions are much lower, ranging from 6.72 in early stages to 2.57 in later rounds, as can be seen in Panel D. Table 7 presents exit multiples by industry segment. There is substantial crosssectional variation in the data. For IPOs, the semiconductor, communications and internet segments evidence the highest multiples, followed closely by the software and hardware segments. A similar pattern is seen in the case of buyout exits, where hardware, software, internet and communications were the segments with the highest exit multiples.
In unreported results, we estimated exit multiples after stratifying the sample by financing round. For early stage financings, the multiples drop rapidly as the round number increases, corresponding to the perceived risk at early rounds. This effect cuts across IPO and acquisition exits. The effect exists, though is weaker for the expansion and later stage financing rounds.
We also examined exit multiples when the data is stratified by deciles of financing amount. For firms exiting via an IPO, the multiples are higher for smaller financings. This effect is more marked for early stage firms than for later stage firms. The fact that a firm invests little, yet makes it to an IPO, would naturally result in greater multiples. For exits via acquisition, there appears to no such effect.
Finally, we examined exit multiples for data stratified by the post-money valuation amount. Since multiples are calculated as a function of the post-money amount, there is a natural inverse relationship here. This is borne out in the data we looked at.
Expected Multiples
5.1. Methodology. To estimate the expected multiple, we proceed as follows. Denote the i th multiple in stage j in year t by X ijt , i = 1...N jt , j ∈ J, t = 1...T , where N jt is the number of financings in stage j in year t and T is the number of years in the database. Stage j is a choice from the set J={early, expansion, late, buyout, other}. For each set of financing multiples X ijt , we compute the expected exit multiple as follows:
which follows from the fact that the multiple for failure to exit is zero. Denote the i th multiple in stage j in industry k by X ijk , i = 1...N jk , jinJ, k = 1...K, where N jk is the number of financings in stage j in industry k and K is the number of industry categories in the database. For each set of financing multiples X ijk , we compute the expected exit multiple as follows:
Note that the expected multiple is an equally weighted multiple.
Finally, we compute the overall expected multiple. Each new firm either exits its private status, or fails to make it to the public company stage. Exit occurs in two forms: (i) IPO and (ii) buyout/acquisition by another firm. The expected multiple X j on firm j from funding round to exit is stated in the following return equations:
These two equations are for the data analyzed by year of financing and by industry category respectively. 5.2. Expected Multiples. Table 8 presents the industry adjusted expected multiples by year of financing. We notice considerable variation in multiples across the time series. Panel A contains industry adjusted multiples for both IPOs and acquisitions, and Panel B contains the expected industry adjusted multiples, which are obtained by multiplying the probability of exit by the exit multiple.
First, notice that expected multiples from early stage financing tend to be much higher than those from the other stages, presumably as a result of the higher risk borne by the private equity investor at this stage of the process. The higher discounts apply to early stage investments and become correspondingly lower for later stage financings. Notice also that there are many years where the expected multiple is less than one, i.e. a negative return. However, in the later years in the sample this is not the case, and substantial multiples were earned in the 1990s. Cochrane (2001) has argued that high levels of return may simply be on account of another form of selection bias, i.e. that firms go public only when they have achieved a high rate of return. He finds that failure to correct for this bias results in average returns in the 700% range. After implementing a correction the arithmetic average returns result in levels in the 50% range. Our sample is fairly comprehensive, and we have a large number of firms that do not result in exits. Hence, we believe that the bias is mitigated. Indeed, we do obtain returns at levels close to those obtained by Cochrane after making the selection bias correction.
Returns may be high because the period studied was one of hot IPO markets, as well as an active M&A market. This may have fueled highly priced exits, with the resultant high return levels.
High returns also reflect the fact that private equity is non-traded, and comes with minimal supervision. Hence, there is a concomitantly appropriate rate of return. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgenssen state that 66% of private companies fail in their first 10 years. All these factors would lead to higher rates of required return on private equity, reflected in the discount charged at the time the venture capitalist invests in these firms. Table 9 contains the amount of the private equity discount by industry segment. There is substantial industry variation in returns or discounts. Communications and the internet segments account for much higher rates of return than do the other categories. The pattern of stage-based returns seen in Table 8 is also in evidence here -early stage investments do provide higher levels of return. And returns on IPOs tend to be much higher than returns on buyout firms, again lending credence to the notion that firms that fail to access the public markets are bought out at lower prices.
Multivariate Analysis
In the previous sections, we have estimated the expected probability of exit, the exit multiples, and expected gains, over time and industry. In this section, we develop a multivariate model of the three components of the gains to private equity investments:
• The probability of an exit, either by IPO or by acquisition, which we denote p j for all financing rounds j.
• The expected multiple from the exit of a private firm, denoted X j .
• The time to exit, which determines the annualized return that is achieved from the investment. We define this to be τ j , and is stated in round years, the reasons for which have already been highlighted in the preceding sections.
We relate each of these determinants of the gains to a set of variables which we have shown to influence them in a univariate framework. Specifically, these factors are:
(1) Stage of financing: this comprises the various possible stages at which the firm can obtain financing. Essentially, there are three possible stages: early stage, expansion stage and later stage. We coded these from 1 to 3 respectively. (2) Round Number: since private equity ventures go through various financing rounds, we include in the information set which round of financing the current one is. The stage of the venture and the financing round are likely to predict the probability of exit, time to exit and valuation multiples. (3) Amount of financing: this is the amount raised in the particular round of financing. The financing amount is likely to be predictive of the returns. (4) Post-money valuation: the post-money value of the firm is likely to be a good predictor of all three functions of interest, the probability of exit, the time to exit and the returns. (5) Momentum variable: This variable is the post valuation value multiplied by the round number. The intuition behind this variable is that exit may be related to the post valuation, only when the round number is fairly advanced. It captures the momentum of the start up firm. (6) New economy indicator: We created a dummy variable, equal to 1, for the firms in high growth industry sectors, which are: computer software and hardware, medical/health, communications, and internet related firms. (7) Hot IPO year indicator: We created a dummy variable for years which were hot IPO years based on the number of IPOs, namely 1986 IPOs, namely , 1991 IPOs, namely -97, 1999 IPOs, namely -2000 . This is the only variable of the data set which is not in the information set at the time of financing. Hence, our results are presented with and without this variable.
6.1. Modeling the probability of exit. This is modeled as a logit function, which we denote as f (x; b), a function of the state variables in the information set (i.e. x) and the logit coefficients b. The function is as follows:
where x comprises an intercept as well as the seven variables described above. Our entire data set comprises a total of 52,322 financing rounds and of these, 5540 rounds contained data on all the variables of interest.
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Our results are summarized in Table 10 . In the basic model, without dummy variables, all the independent variables are highly significant, but for post-money valuation. As expected, the probability of exit is positively related to financing stage.
Firms in the later stage are more likely to exit. Since the coefficient on stage is approximately 0.25, and the stages are numbered sequentially, on average, advancement to the next stage improves the chances of exit by 25% (ceteris paribus). The round number is also positively related to exit probability. It is interesting to note that the round amount is negatively related to exit probability. Clearly, the closer the firm gets to IPO, there is less need to raise funds privately, and the venture is better off waiting for higher valuations in the public markets, where the private equity discount is not factored in. The post-valuation amount does not appear to have much impact on the exit probability. However, post-valuation in the later rounds is meaningful, since good valuations presage a successful IPO. We see this indicated in the significant positive relationship of the momentum variable, which is the product of the valuation amount and the round number.
Introduction of an industry variable for the high growth, new economy type firms shows that this variable is negatively related to the probability of exit. This may reflect the higher degree of exit risk of this sector, where the so-called "bubble" phenomenon might have been more prevalent.
Our final model also uses the hot IPO year dummy. This variable comes in highly significant as would be expected. It also renders the industry dummy non-significant. While it is useful to confirm this effect, the variable is not one that could be used for the purpose of forecasting since its value is not known ex-ante. In summary, our logit model for the probability of exit provides a good fit, enabling us to make exante inferences about the distribution of the probability of successful exit of private venture financings.
6.2. Time to exit. While successful exit is of prime concern to investors, the time to exit is also an important consideration, for two reasons. First, the time to exit determines the effective annualized return from the private equity investment. Second, the time to exit must be palatable with the risk horizons of the investor. We model the time to exit τ j for each firm as an exponential function of the conditioning variables.
where x is as defined before, and c is the vector of coefficients in the regression. This model is easily estimated using linear regressions by taking logs of both sides of the equation above. The left-hand-side variable [i.e. ln(τ )] is defined as the log of the number of days from financing date to exit date. We ran this estimation on the subset of firms from the previous subsection that had exits, i.e. a total of 1942 firms.
The results in Table 11 show that time to exit (conditional on exit) is inversely related to the financing stage, and the round number, which is confirmatory of our univariate results. The amount of financing in the round does not appear to matter substantially. However, post-round valuation is inversely related to the exit time. It is likely that the incidence of a strong valuation encourages firms to capitalize on this and go to the public market sooner.
6.3. Investment multiples. As we can see from Figure 2 , the exit multiples appear to have a distribution of the exponential family. There are some noticeable features of the plots. First, the earlier the stage, the wider and higher is the range of exit multiples. In the case of the early stage financing rounds, there are some multiples that are even greater than 20, and this accounts for the trailing spike in the histogram. The plots clearly show clustering at the lower end, with an extremely long tail, reflecting the so-called "long-shot" feature of private equity investing.
We decided to fit the data to (a) the exponential distribution, and (b) the Weibull distribution. The former is a one-parameter model and the latter contains two parameters. Fitting was undertaken by maximum likelihood.
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The exit multiple X j is computed by dividing the value at exit by the post valuation figure for each financing round. Note that we do not annualize here, as the time to exit is not part of the ex-ante information set. Nevertheless, the fit to the data is extremely good. We summarize the two probability distributions we chose to work with:
• Exponential distribution: the probability density function used in the maximum likelihood estimator is
The mean of this distribution is η.
• Weibull distribution: the probability density function is
where b is the shape or slope parameter, and η is the scale parameter. The mean of the Weibull distribution is ηΓ(
, where Γ(.) is the gamma function. The Weibull includes the exponential as a special case when b = 1.
We estimated these two models for the entire sample of firms which exited, i.e. 1942 firms. We also obtained the fit by the variable STAGE, since we had found in the earlier work in this paper that it is an important determinant of the realized multiple. The results are reported in Table 12 .
We draw the following conclusions from the fitted models. First, the exponential family fits the data very well, with high parameter significance levels. Second, we can see from the location parameter η in both distributions that the exit multiple declines as we go from the early stage to the late stage, concomitant with the expected riskreturn relationship. Third, except for the later stage financings, the two-parameter Weibull distribution does significantly better than the single parameter exponential model. We can see this from a comparison of log-likelihoods.
Lastly, we explore the relationship of the investment multiple to various firm level variables that are available to us. Guided by the good fit of the exponential and Weibull distributions we work with the logarithm of the exit multiples as the dependent variable. We use the same dependent variables as chosen for the time to exit and the probability of exit. We regressed the log of the multiplier on the independent variables using simple linear regression on the cross-section of firms. The regression was run for all firms, and for firms in the early stage, expansion stage and later stages of investment. Results are presented in Table 13 . Panel A contains parameter values when the dependent variable is the raw multiple. Panel B uses industry adjusted multiples as dependent variables.
The table shows that most of our variables come in with expected signs and are highly significant. First, the stage of investment is inversely related to the multiple, i.e. the later the stage the lower the multiple. Second, a similar inverse relationship is noticed for the round number. Third, the greater the invested amount the lower the multiple. Fourth, multiples are inversely related to the financing amount. Finally, our momentum variable, industry dummies and hot IPO market dummies are all positively related to the multiple as is expected. Similar results are obtained whether we look at the data across all stages, or even for individual stages of financing. The evidence in Table 13 shows that exit multiples can be modeled using the information set available at the time of financing.
Summary & Implications
Little is known about the risk and return characteristics of private equity investments. We examine over 52,000 financing rounds by venture and buyout funds and estimate the probability of exit, the expected multiples and the gains from private equity investments. Our analysis shows that the probability of exit, the valuation multiple, and the expected gains depend upon the industry, the stage of the firm being financed, the financing amount, and the prevailing market sentiment.
In addition to our study being the first comprehensive examination of the gains from venture-backed financing, the results have implications for valuing private companies. Unlike publicly traded firms, a private company has no observable stock price to serve as an objective measure of market value. Therefore, to value private companies, many valuation experts tend to find a set of comparable publicly traded companies and take valuation ratios like price-to-sales or price-to-earnings, and apply these to the observable accounting characteristics of the private companies. They next apply a marketability discount to account for the lack of liquidity, because there does not exist a ready market for these investments. The amount of discount to be applied is often ad-hoc. Our expected exit multiples can provide a guideline about the appropriate amount of marketability discount.
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Our empirical results may be used to estimate the marketability discount using the following equations:
As an example, if E[X] = 1.5, then D = 33%. We find that financing in late stage companies, the private equity discounts are about 11%, and for early stage companies the discounts are 80%. It is important to understand that what we are capturing is more than a non-tradeability discount. The venture capitalists provide an important monitoring and mentoring role to the companies they finance. They often sit on boards of companies in which they invest, and make available their network to these companies. Thus, almost certainly a part of the return is due to these activities. These high returns are to some extent being driven by success of investments in the new economy companies like internet businesses, semi-conductor, software and biotech.
Our study is the first step in understanding the risk premium required for the valuation of private equity investments. It will be of particular interest to the VC community and valuation practitioners. 17 It is important to understand that what we are capturing is more than a non-tradeability discount. The venture capitalists provide an important monitoring and mentoring role to the companies they finance. They often sit on boards of companies in which they invest, and make available their network to these companies. Thus, almost certainly a part of the return is due to these activities. Frequency of industry adjusted exit multiples for the firms in our sample having an IPO or an Accquisition/Buyout. The sample is obtained from Thompson Financial Data's VentureExpert database which obtains information on private equity investments from over 1,000 different companies ; 700 of these partner companies are venture funds, while over 250 are buyout and other equity funds. The sample spans over the period 1980 to 2000 for investments made in 23,208 US firms. The probabilities of exit by year of financing. Panel A presents the probability of an IPO, Panel B presents the probability of an Acquisition/Buyout and Panel C presents probability of an IPO or an Acquisition. Total exit probabilities are depicted in Panel C. In addition to the total probability of exit, we also present the probability when exit occurs within three years of financing. The exit probability is presented by financing stage, i.e. early, expansion, later, buyout stage or others. The probability of an exit by IPO is computed to be the ratio of the number of firms in any financing year that led to an IPO divided by the number of financing rounds in the same year. The probability of an exit by acquisition is computed to be the ratio of the number of firms in any financing year that led to a buyout divided by the number of financing rounds in the same year. The average across all years is the number of exits divided by the total number of financings. Notice that we present averages only for the period 1980-1997. This is due to the fact that the data on financing from 1998-2000 is too recent to determine whether or not exit has definitively occurred, or failed to occur.
Early Stage Expansion Stage Later Stage Others
Panel B: Probability of a Buyout/Acquisition The probabilities of exit by industry. Panel A presents the probability of an IPO, Panel B presents the probability of an Acquisition/Buyout and Panel C presents probability of an IPO or an Acquisition. Total exit probabilities are depicted in Panel C. In addition to the total probability of exit, we also present the probability when exit occurs within three years of financing. The exit probability is presented by financing stage, i.e. early, expansion, later, buyout stage or others. The probability of an exit by IPO is computed to be the ratio of the number of firms in any financing year that led to an IPO divided by the number of financing rounds in the same year. The probability of an exit by acquisition is computed to be the ratio of the number of firms in any financing year that led to a buyout divided by the number of financing rounds in the same year. The average across all years is the number of exits divided by the total number of financings. The valuation multiples categorized by the year in which financing was received. Panel A and B present raw multiples when firms had an IPO or a buyout/accquisition. Panels C and D present industry adjusted multiples. The "raw" mutliple is computed as the ratio of the post-money value of the firm when it exits to the post-money valuation it received at the time of financing. The annualized multiple is the raw mutliple annualized to the nearest year. Corresponding industry adjusted multiples are the ratio of the raw multiples and performance of publicly traded firms in the same industry. The expected multiples for our sample firms categorized by industry. Panel A presents the industry adjusted multiple for firms having an IPO or an Accquisition/Buyout. Panel B presents the expected industry adjusted multiple estimated as the product of the probability of an exit via an IPO or an Accquisition/Buyout and the industry adjusted multiple. Estimates of a logit model relating the probability of exit to the stage of financing, round of financing, amount of financing, post money valuation, Interaction between the round of financing and post money valuation, industry dummy which takes on a value equal 1 in case the company financed was in the Computer Hardware, Computer Software, Communications, Medical/Health or Internet and 0 otherwise, and a dummy which takes on a value equal 1 in case the financing is in the Hot IPO period and 0 otherwise. t-statistics are below the parameter estimates. 
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